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ABSTRACT 
 
       A general methodology and specific formalism are used  to  restrict  the 
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics.   A  natural psi-collapse to 
reality is developed in an equation with terms independent of  the measuring 
equipment. 
        The theory requires one of  three experiments for  the ensemble average of  
position, momentum, or  energy, or a probability-experiment. 
        Both classically and quantum mechanically, we  define Artscience (AS) as 
Logic-Epistemology in Physics, where epistemology is treated as 
phenomenology.  AS (logic-phenomenology)  is thus shown to be related to 
Physics (formalism-data) .  
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1. INTRODUCTION. Artscience (hereinafter AS) - what is it? The answer to this 
question will be given in this paper from a physical (and scientific) viewpoint. AS 
is  “Logic-Epistemology in Physics”,  in general holding classically and quantum 
mechanically (both are treated with examples). In practice, the field of Philosophy 
also contains metaphysics as what would be a third main branch, but AS does 
not; AS is explicitly just Logic-Epistemology (logic-phenomenology).   
     In Sect. 2 we define AS. The discussion of analogies between  Physics, the 
Scientific Method, and AS follows and is summarized in a Table. AS is 
incomplete, and this is handled. Sect. 3 briefly deals with AS and classical 
physics. 
     In Sect. 4,  we  continue the discussion of AS, treating the Copenhagen 
interpretation of quantum mechanics and attendant metaphysics. We attempt the 
derivation of a truly non-ontological (AS)  interpretation of quantum mechanics, 
as a theory of measurement containing a theoretically physical psi-collapse 
equation.  This physics comes somewhat far into the paper, i.e., in Sect. 4, 
following necessary preliminary material.  The technical and interested reader is 
directed to read Sect. 4 first and then to read the entire paper subsequent to this 
for the valuable perspective of a viable non-ontological methodology.  Sect. 5 
gives the Conclusions. 
  
2. DEFINITIONS AND DISCUSSION. We now narrow-in on what is meant by AS 
by displaying Definitions 1 - 3 in the Table. We have already emphasized that 
Def. 3 is the one we propose in this paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
1. PHYSICS 
 
THEORY 
a) Postulates 
b) Derivation 
c) Predictions 
 
 EXPERIMENT 
a) Empirical state-of-the-art 
b) Measurement 
  
 
2.  SCIENTIFIC  
         METHOD 
 
 
HYPOTHESES 
a) Mathematical theory 
b) Predictions 
 
TEST 
a) Experiment 
b) Testing hypotheses 
 
 
3. ARTSCIENCE  
           (AS) 
 
LOGIC 
a) Scientific  
propositions  
b) Inference 
c) Deductions 
 
 EPISTEMOLOGY 
      
      Physical  phenomenology 
 
Table.  Definitions 1, 2, and 3 are compared.  The Table is read left-to-right 
(rows) and up-and-down (columns). 
 
 
     The Table is discussed in the remainder of this Section. Under the main 
heading in each box in the Table comes a description which are self-explanatory.  
The breakdown of a Definition in the Table  is shown in Columns 2 and 3: Row 1 
is the definition (breakdown) of Physics, etc. Respective boxes are basically 
interrelated as we shall see. 
      As pertains to Def. 1, Max Planck has said that “Physics at its highest level is 
art.”  Hereinafter, we take the opposite approach (science vs. art), letting AS be 
in part different from physics and seeing with what we can identify it. The prefix 
"Art-" in “Artscience” means then that AS is incomplete or as such "less 
technical" than physics (physical science). We demand consistently, however, 
that AS remains technical as far as it holds (technical in the sense of physics), 
and therefore it is identified as technical-philosophy in physics. 
(Logic-Epistemology). Aside from  Planck's comment and dubbing with  the 
“state-of-the-art”, art is obviously less technical and technological than science  -  
so is AS, as we shall see when we study its inherent incompleteness 
(insufficiency).  
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      Rows 1 and 2 of the Table are standard, complete and filled-in already. We 
have however a place to put AS in the Table. Note that it is in Column 1, 
replacing the unwieldy phrases "technical-philosophy in physics" and 
"Logic-Epistemology in Physics" with AS. Def. 3 is perfectly appropriate and 
reasonable. It is substantial, accurate, consistently justified, and not merely 
convenient. We make the consistent identification of AS with Logic-Epistemology 
throughout this paper. 
      As for Column 2, scientific propositions are compared directly with 
hypotheses, and these relate analogously to postulates. Inference (deductions), 
mathematical theory (predictions), and derivation (predictions) are also 
interrelated. Column 3 likewise follows naturally  (note that any controls are 
included in a Test). 
     We are focusing on Def. 3 as the definition of AS. Def. 3 for AS treats physics 
nominally as logic and  phenomenology, the latter being based on data from 
experimentation (see below; it is understood that not all experiments are state-
of-the-art).  
     Now we have the first of two essential points to make: Logic is  less  technical  
than formalism in theory in that any derivation in theoretical physics typically 
relies upon one or more branches of mathematics other than logic (it is 
incomplete, as mentioned above). Logic comprises the hypothetical propositions, 
the reasoning between equations, the equations themselves (derived from the 
propositions in a formal sense), and the inferred final result: using mathematics. 
       As for the third Column of Def. 3, the idea that epistemology is 
phenomenological is standard (‘things themselves’), q.v., the philosophies of 
Husserl, Heidegger and others (see Sect. 3  for clarification; cf. also Mach’s 
phenomenalism, and Bertrand Russell). In physics, we take  phenomenology to 
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be an integral part of experiment, specifically data-taking, the analysis of data, 
and error analysis (cf. Ne’eman 1998). 
     Our second essential point may now be made: Phenomenology is less 
technical than experiment because it starts with taking data and is not involved 
in, say, the design, building or operation of an experiment (again, the 
incompleteness mentioned above; this comes directly from the definition of 
“phenomenology”). An example of epistemology in physics is the Copenhagen 
interpretation  (Omnes 1994, p. 85) [see Sect. 4 for problems with this]. 
     The rows of the Table are completely reasonable (necessary) while the 
columns depict the  close relationship of the entries. Since Column 2 entries are 
all related and similarly for Column 3, Column 1 entries are thus clearly 
interrelated. In each row, the Column 2 entry is  posited, and Column 3 is used in 
verifying it experimentally or not (exact science). In the terminology of Omnes 
(1994, p. 529), epistemological theory of knowledge is the correlation of a 
representation of reality (phenomenology) and logic-mathematics. Then 
knowledge (AS, a physical law) obtains as the result of their correspondence. We 
just write this, in our terminology, as Logic-Epistemology (Epistemology in the 
Table is actually “phenomenology” plus this comparison with logic). The 
preliminaries for AS have now been  completed in this Section. 
     It should be noted that in this paper we concentrate on the predictive Scientific 
Method, although not to the exclusion of postdiction (transcendental 
phenomenology). In practice, in some cases, we may deal with postdictive 
models, or experimental discoveries which have not been predicted, or 
observations: This is understood. 
 
3. THE ARTSCIENCES IN CLASSICAL PHYSICS. In Sect. 2, we developed AS 
as Logic-Epistemology (in Physics). Let us now pose the question "What are the 
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artsciences?" [trivially, we are free to use a lower case convention, e.g., for the 
plural (artsciences), or a specific artscience (logic or epistemology), etc.]. By 
recalling Planck’s comment, if taken literally, AS would not merely be 
technical-philosophy in physics (i.e., logic-phenomenology), but AS would be 
basic physical science. Instead, as before, we make the obvious and new case 
that the artsciences are precisely logic and epistemology in physics (physical 
science). This is a natural identification and appropriate terminology.  
     Let us now look at metaphysics in some detail, such as it is philosophy and 
not an artscience in classical physics.   
     Firstly, we cite a concrete classical example.  The reader may note that 
cosmology has traditionally been metaphysical, but  in modern physics it is 
treated as a mature physical science: This is progress in the history of physics. 
Anyway, one example of  ‘persistent’ metaphysics cited up to the present is the 
teleological strong anthropic principle, which we reject. Delsemme (1998)  
characterizes this, in short, by saying that the universe is explained “in terms of a 
final purpose: the emergence of humankind.”  He continues that this principle 
does not “allow scientific arguments to fit in with metaphysical considerations.” 
We do not subscribe to this blatant myth (which falls outside of Logic-
Epistemology). 
        Secondly, we give another example, still in classical physics, namely 
Shimony’s (1978, p. 12) treatment of Kant’s “non-ontological philosophy”. This is 
transcendental philosophy central to which  is that we have “no knowledge of 
things in themselves, but only knowledge of phenomena”.  Comparing this to 
phenomenological artscience in Sect. 2, it is seen to be Omnes’ “representation 
of reality”, so AS is consistent with non-ontological philosophy (vs. metaphysics). 
      These two examples support our position for AS in the classical case. Thirdly, 
from Mach’s positivist-antimetaphysical philosophy of science to Kant to AS, 
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metaphysics is undesirable and expendable as it is inconsistent and incompatible 
with science. We leave the classical case here; our following treatment of 
quantum mechanics, where the problem is, will be much more in depth. 
 
4. AS IN QUANTUM PHYSICS. As mentioned above, AS  plays a general role in 
both classical and quantum physics. We turn our attention now to quantum 
mechanics in this Section. With our reasoning above intact, we ask what a fully 
non-ontological AS interpretation of  quantum mechanics would say differently 
than the Copenhagen interpretation about the foundations of quantum 
mechanics?  It turns out that it is equally important to ask ‘what it does not say 
(viz., metaphysics)’. We can find ontology  mentioned in the literature explicitly in 
connection with the Copenhagen interpretation, but we consider this non-
technical-philosophy in physics and, again, not AS  (Shimony 1978, pp.11-12).   
      In the literature, there are criticisms (minority view) of the Copenhagen or 
standard interpretation, but we will not enter into the vagaries (or spectacular 
successes) of quantum mechanics in this paper beyond treating  them somewhat 
simply, notably the complex ψ-function collapse or reduction and the 
“measurement problem”  in the foundations of quantum mechanics. AS is not 
claimed to be a complete replacement for the Copenhagen interpretation, 
obviously because of its phenomenological incompleteness (Sect. 2), and yet it is 
intriguing to see how far we can take this concept with a theory of measurement. 
     The ideas of Bohr, Heisenberg, and Born say that there is no reality until a 
measurement is made. This is somewhat analogous to AS/phenomenology as 
we have derived it, from a totally new perspective, by denying that metaphysics 
is an artscience and identifying AS with Logic-Epistemology.  Phenomenology 
and the Copenhagen interpretation seem roughly concordant  and consistent, 
which is totally unintentional, hence Omnes’ phraseology “Copenhagen 
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epistemology”. Neither AS/phenomenology nor the Copenhagen interpretation 
treat reality pre-measurement. We reiterate this point, that AS/phenomenology (a 
representation of reality) and the Copenhagen interpretation share in common 
the gross feature of not treating reality before measurement (cf. logic-
mathematics below); q.v., the Copenhagen  interpretation’s “contextual reality ” 
or “observation-created reality” (Hobson 1999). 
      We take ‘until a measurement is made’ to mean at the end of psi-collapse (or 
interference).  In our terms, measurement begins theoretically when a quantum 
system is disturbed by some apparatus (the detector) during measurement, i.e., 
at the point where the respective Hilbert spaces are coupled as 
          H  ≡ Hsystem  ⊗  Happaratus     .                          Eq. (1) 
           
 
Starting with Eq. (1), we attempt to produce a theoretical example of a non-
ontological AS interpretation consistent with experiment. Phenomenology alone, 
starting only with the data-taking stage of experimentation, is not going to 
completely replace the Copenhagen epistemology. They play different roles in 
quantum physics, but neither treat what happens before experimental 
measurement except in  theory.  AS/logic has however something  to add to this. 
      For the moment we revert to the uncoupled case. When extended, the 
‘Copenhagen interpretation’ mixes in theory with what is supposed to be a  
“contextual” Copenhagen epistemology (“experimental context”). This is done by 
introducing probability, viz., the wave mechanical probability amplitude 
 ψ ≡ ψ(x i , t)  and the probability density P  ≡ | ψ | 2   .  It  claims the status of a 
quantum system is one of possibility, indeterminate (probabilistic)  before it is 
disturbed as a result of a “contextual” measurement. Instead, the present 
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interpretation is theoretically physical (non-ontological) and so are all the 
equations in it. 
     Continuing with our example of an ideally non-ontological AS interpretation, 
we consider a quantum system for which ψ ∈ Hsystem , theoretically, the  
related  absolute value squared being given by  the basic step 
                                   P 
 
=
 
 ψ∗ ψ     .                                                                          Eq. (2) 
We take ψ  to be normalized. The magnitude squared is real and has physical 
dimensions of length-3 , to wit, the dimensionless probability 
 
              Π
 
(t)
 
 ≡  V∫ P  (x i , t) d3x     
                                                                                                                                                 Eq. (3)                                
                                                                                                       
=  V∫ | ψ | 2  d3x      ,                                                                                                      
                                                                              
 
which is the probability that a particle is in a volume V at time t (as a function of 
time; cf. wave-particle duality). 
     ψ  is theoretically physical and describes the probabilistic possibilities, as the 
Copenhagen interpretation implies. It  has physical units (see Eq. (3)).  ψ  is also, 
naively, a function of a real spacetime coordinate argument solving a partial 
differential equation, such  as the time-dependent Schroedinger equation, 
for example, with spacetime partial derivatives. All this  argues for theoretically 
physical formalism (not ontology), applicable predictably prior to ‘Copenhagen 
observation’. 
        Integrating Eq. (3) over all space, we find the system exists with a 
probability of unity ( Π = 1; certainty). Rather than saying objective or physical 
reality exists pre-measurement in quantum mechanics, we shall say that a 
(degree of) certainty exists  in the theory of measurement normalization. This is 
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not the EPR reality criterion (Einstein et al. 1935) in another guise, because the 
system is disturbed by measurement. 
     The complex conjugate plays its usual role  as integration using the probability 
amplitude gives the  real expectation value of a dynamical variable (observable),  
with Hermitian operator O, namely  
<V> =  ∫ ψ∗ O ψ d3x     ,                                           Eq.(4)                                                                                       
                                                                all space 
integrating over all space. N.B.: In bracklets <V> , V is a variable and not volume. 
Eq. (4) models statistical measurement in theory - as a collapse equation.  O ψ   
could be viewed heuristically (at first glance) as something like a collapsed 
wavefunction, although it is not one (for one thing it has the wrong units). 
Evidently, this is an effective operator-state-collapse, where operating with O on 
ψ and multiplying by ψ∗  yields  psi-collapse (statistically). Below we will 
incorporate the effects of interference into the collapse. From psi-collapse 
occurring  in Eq. (4), we have obtained the prediction (model) of <V>;  Eq. (4) is 
of course well-known.  It is the collapse interpretation that is new. The traditional 
term “collapse” may be misleading, particularly if   O ψ   just gives back  ψ  times 
an eigenvalue: Nevertheless we use it, substituting formalism for ontology; we 
will call ψ∗ O ψ   the collapse (see Eq. (3) as the collapse probability). Incidently, 
probabilities and expectation values obtain in quantum logic, which we do not 
treat here.                                                                                                                                                           
     State function ψ specifies the state, i.e., it tells us all that we can know about 
the system.  Phenomenology picks up an experiment at the data-taking stage 
and so says nothing about psi-collapse or  “contextual reality”. Quantum theory is 
where we must look for a solution (an understanding of quantum mechanics), as 
a theory of measurement subject and open to experimental verification, and not 
as a Copenhagen epistemology. 
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    Theoretically, we have partially solved the problem  of how a  probability 
amplitude predicts statistical  measurements in reality through Eqs. (3) and (4).  
An AS interpretation without ontology is useful even if not complete. We may  
extend our rule of AS to the logic (‘no metaphysics’, or in this case no ontology)  
and rely on theory and experiment  to give the coupled physics (ff.). We would 
expect, analogous to Eqs. (2) and (3), to encounter a  coupled term                      
                                                              
 
                                       P ≡  | ψ + φ | 2                                                                                   
            Eq. (5)                                 
            =  | ψ | 2  +  φ∗ ψ +  ψ∗ φ  +   | φ | 2      ,  
                                                                              
                                                    
where  φ ≡ φ (x i , t)  ∈ Happaratus  (the detector) interferes with 
ψ →ψ + φ  predominately in a volume  
 
                                                            
                                       ∆ x ∆ y ∆ z      ,                                                       Eq. (6) 
 
 
having chosen spatial coordinates.  In averaging statistically to get these 
uncertainties, the superposed total wavefunction ψ + φ  is used (first we normalize 
ψ and φ and then  ψ + φ , this being understood). We note that even uncertainties 
are real and have physical dimensions, as above, i.e., they are physical 
quantities (as is the quantum of action). 
      Eq. (4) in our theory of measurement is simple and basic.   A full (and 
coupled) treatment has to look at an interference-collapse equation integrand like 
                                                                            
                O   ≡   (ψ∗ + φ∗) O (ψ + φ)                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                      Eq. (7)                                 
                                                      =   ψ∗ Oψ  +  φ∗ Oψ  +  ψ∗ Oφ  + 
 
φ∗ Oφ 
 
 
(analogous to Eq. (4)), where collapse is attributable to O, or to interference 
cross-terms, or evidently both, etc. The factor  (ψ∗ + φ∗) O φ  in  Eq. (7) for O is 
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arguably “contextual” (in theory), e.g., the terms O φ or  φ∗O φ   may show 
“observation-created” collapse (due to the presence of φ ; formalism replacing 
ontology). Three of the four terms in writing-out  Eq. (7) may be “contextual”, 
containing φ or φ∗ , and similarly for Eq. (5).  The remaining terms however are not 
“observation-created” in this sense of containing  φ or φ∗ : i.e.,  | ψ | 2   in  Eq. (5) 
and ψ∗ Oψ  in Eq. (7). This point is crucial to our argument that quantum 
mechanics is not entirely “contextual” (cf. normalization of ψ + φ ). 
      We  may redefine (and generalize) Eq. (4), substituting the integrand of Eq. 
(7), such that upon including φ we have an observable ensemble average  
   <V> ≡    ∫  O  d3x     ,                                              Eq. (8)                                                          
                                                                 all space 
 
           
integrating over all space ( for  position, momentum, or  Hamiltonian operators) .     
Hereinafter < O > means Eq. (8): This is our new and final interference-collapse 
equation.  Eq. (8) and its integrand are being called the collapse consistently. 
Theory defines stages for us  in the theory of measurement,  coupling  
(ψ ⊗ φ  ∈  H   ) , superposition ψ + φ ,  interference, via  the cross-terms of  O    
in Eq. (7) ,  and  collapse in  Eq. (8)  for   <V>.  Once  collapsed, there is 
disturbance of the system.  
    In AS, logic and phenomenology develop independently, although in  
physics an experimentalist may well  look at theoretical predictions before setting 
out on his or her labors. Experiment to date supports quantum mechanics by and 
large -  a  full treatment must propose an experiment to find for AS or                         
the  Copenhagen  interpretation   (i.e., non-ontological predictions vs. ontology).                                                   
Firstly, zero-out the pure φ  term (Eqs. 7-8) during calibration with ψ ≡ 
0 . Experiment could test the collapse physics of ψ∗ O ψ  (Eq. (7)), which in part, 
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when integrated, would give the ensemble average corresponding to O .  The 
total Eq. (8)  must yield a subsequent semi-empirical Eq. (4) not involving  φ .  
Eq. (8) must  agree with experiment; cf. also the term | ψ | 2   (Eq.(5)).   
     Experiment  also has something to say about  the  related problems of the 
EPR experiment, violation of local realism (Torgerson et al. 1995), nonlocality in 
realistic interpretations of quantum mechanics (Hardy 1992), and entanglement 
(Ghirardi 2002). It is beyond the scope and purpose of this paper to go into the 
details of these problems (spacelike acausality). Anyhow, we have a caveat. 
       So far nobody (including Bohr) has “fully […] worked out a coherent  non-
ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics”, but we may be “forced to 
accept” one (Shimony 1978, p. 12).   This does not include the Copenhagen 
interpretation; what has been presented in this Section runs counter to the 
metaphysical (ontological).  We have attempted to outline how to proceed, 
admittedly, with a very simple-minded interpretation example: Whether or not we 
have succeeded fully, the concept of a manifestly non-ontological interpretation is 
still a necessary goal for future work.  Our present interpretation merely says that 
a collapse equation exists, and that the foundations of quantum mechanics  have  
compelling aspects of being theoretically physical (vs. ontology; “contextual 
reality” notwithstanding). It has been tried, but perhaps an ensemble approach to 
quantum mechanics may still be envisaged, even though Ghirardi (2002) says 
there are no deterministic or random local hidden variables in quantum 
mechanics (the distributions P   and  P  are not random). 
       The AS interpretation is a welcome challenge in this paper, derived by 
applying the AS rule (no metaphysics)  to quantum mechanics. We emphasize 
that the interpretation example/theory of measurement should not be allowed to 
detract from AS as worked out and presented in Sect. 2 (in the Table), because it 
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is just an outline of what might be going on in quantum mechanics when we 
eliminate ontology.  
     The issues in this Section are fundamental ones when brought to bear on the 
foundations of quantum mechanics and the Copenhagen interpretation. Finally, 
to recapitulate, metaphysics plays no role in quantum mechanics using the Logic-
Epistemology method. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS. We identify and define AS as Logic-Epistemology in Physics. 
Physical Science, the Scientific Method and AS are intimately and basically  
related; we have  compared Theory-Experiment and Hypothesis-Test with Logic-
Epistemology in the Table (classically or quantum mechanically).  
     The theoretical side of AS/logic is constituted by the hypothetical propositions, 
the reasoning between equations, the equations themselves (formally),  and the 
deduced final result. The logic is incomplete as compared to theory because of 
the additional mathematics involved (beside logic). 
     On the experimental side of AS/phenomenology, AS is data-taking and 
subsequent data-analysis but not earlier stages of experiment such as design, 
construction and operation (incompleteness). We treat Epistemology as 
phenomenology and the comparison of phenomenology with logic. 
        The comparison of logic and phenomenology gives us a law of physics (AS; 
or it may fail methodologically to confirm a theory, of course). Also,  AS          
takes on the meaning encompassing all the laws in different areas of Physics, 
when logic and phenomenology agree, and there is no metaphysics.  
     One of our primary motivations has been to clarify the precise role of 
philosophy in AS, with its (two) technical branches, the artsciences: logic in 
physics and epistemology in physics.  We see that we must simply retain only 
necessary and relevant essentials, i.e., Logic-Epistemology, but not metaphysics. 
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If  philosophy is to be used in physics at all, it must be as AS. As long as there 
are fields like “Philosophy in Physics and Philosophy of Science”, to be rigorous, 
we have to specify what is meant by "Philosophy": It is AS. 
      Physicists should (and indeed all scientists and philosophers of science may)  
appreciate the relative simplicity of AS and its ultimate utility in classical and 
quantum physics, and in treating the Copenhagen interpretation.  In AS, as 
compared to  Philosophy, we must ignore non-technical-philosophy 
(metaphysics). There is no possibility of having metaphysical aspects of physical 
laws or natural phenomena if we follow the AS prescription (Logic-Epistemology) 
in the amenable cases of classical and quantum physics, each of which have 
been treated separately (focusing on the Copenhagen interpretation). AS is more 
natural than Philosophy  not containing metaphysical assumptions at all. There is 
this explicit difference between them; AS qualifies philosophy to be 
technical-philosophy in physics (the artsciences). AS specifies and exhibits the 
structure of the artsciences, explicitly as  Logic-Epistemology, eliminating 
metaphysics which might be implicit  when one says "Philosophy". 
     AS falls short of being able to completely model Physical Science. It has been 
emphasized how the role played by AS is less technical than the Scientific 
Method (and Physics) clearly showing the limitations of AS. When we say less 
technical we mean less complete, the role of this incompleteness present in AS 
being explained in detail. This is interesting in and of itself, having the result that 
quantum physical phenomenology is similar to the Copenhagen interpretation’s 
considering nothing  before measurement (except through theory and statistics). 
       A non-ontological solution to the “measurement problem” has been sought in 
a theory of measurement (couple, superpose, interfer, collapse, disturb) subject 
to experimental verification. We have identified the collapse equation for  <V>.  
The terms   P   and   O   describe the collapse of the wavefunction, and  φ∗O φ  
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(among other terms) may be attributed to “observation-created” collapse due to 
the presence of φ. Of prime importance (for experiment) are the terms not 
containing φ. The non-ontological AS interpretation of quantum mechanics is 
theoretically physical  and testable. 
     In short, we have seen two significant things: 1) what AS does entail 
(Logic-Epistemology) and what it does not (it is free of metaphysics) and 2) that it 
is only a partial model of Physical Science (incompleteness), 
     We can now answer the question that we started out with ... what is AS? AS  
is  a classical or non-ontological quantum mechanical  law of physics at the 
endpoint of any research, by way of  the quantitative comparison (agreement) of 
logic and phenomenology (Logic-Epistemology) - or all such laws of nature and  
equations in Physics. 
 
Note: There are two References listed (Weinberg 1977a, b) which bear little 
resemblance to AS as it has evolved and appears in the present paper. They are 
given just for historical completeness (incidently, the terminology AS was  
developed independently of the German Kunstwissenschaft  which is a 
philosophy of art, as opposed to philosophy of science).  
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